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Abstract
Motivated by the application of real-time pricing in e-commerce platforms, we consider
the problem of revenue-maximization in a setting where the seller can leverage contextual
information describing the customer’s history and the product’s type to predict her valuation of
the product. However, her true valuation is unobservable to the seller, only binary outcome
in the form of success-failure of a transaction is observed. Unlike in usual contextual bandit
settings, the optimal price/arm given a covariate in our setting is sensitive to the detailed
characteristics of the residual uncertainty distribution. We develop a semi-parametric model in
which the residual distribution is non-parametric and provide the first algorithm which learns
both regression parameters and residual distribution with O˜(
√
n) regret. We empirically test a
scalable implementation of our algorithm and observe good performance.
1 Introduction
Many e-commerce platforms are experimenting with approaches to personalized dynamic pricing
based on the customer’s context (i.e. customer’s prior search/purchase history and the product’s
type). However, the mapping from context to optimal price needs to be learned. Our paper develops
a bandit learning approach towards solving this problem motivated by practical considerations faced
by online platforms. In our model, customers arrive sequentially, and each customer is interested
in buying one product. The customer purchases the product if her valuation (unobserved by the
platform) for the product exceeds the price set by the seller. The platform observes the covariate
vector corresponding to the context, and chooses a price. The customer buys the item if and only if
the price is lower than her valuation.
We emphasize three salient features of this model; taken together, these are the features that
distinguish our work. First, feedback is only binary: either the customer buys the item, or she does
not. In other words, the platform must learn from censored feedback. This type of binary feedback
is a common feature of practical demand estimation problems, since typically exact observation of
the valuation of a customer is not possible.
Second, the platform must learn the functional form of the relationship between the covariates
and the expected valuation. In our work, we assume a parametric model for this relationship. In
particular, we presume that the expected value of the logarithm of the valuation is linear in the
covariates. Among other things, this formulation has the benefit that it ensures valuations are
always nonnegative. Further, from a technical standpoint, we demonstrate that this formulation
also admits efficient estimation of the parametric model.
Third, the platform must also learn the distribution of residual uncertainty that determines
the actual valuation given the covariates; in other words, the distribution of the error between the
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expected logarithm of the valuation, and the actual logarithm of the valuation, given covariates. In
our work we make minimal assumptions about the distribution of this residual uncertainty. Thus
while the functional relationship between covariates and the expected logarithm of the valuation is
parametric (i.e., linear), the distribution of the error is nonparametric; for this reason, we refer to
our model as a semi-parametric dynamic pricing model.
The challenge is to ensure that we can efficiently learn both the coefficients in the parametric
model, as well as the distribution of the error. A key observation we leverage is that our model
exhibits free exploration: testing a single covariate-vector-to-price mapping at a given time can
simultaneously provide information about several such mappings. We develop an arm elimination
approach which maintains a set of active prices at each time, where the set depends on the covariate
vector of the current customer. The set is reduced over time by eliminating empirically suboptimal
choices.
We analyze our approach both theoretically and empirically. We analyze regret against the
following standard oracle: the policy that optimally chooses prices given the true coefficients in
the parametric linear model, as well as the distribution of the error, but without knowledge of the
exact valuation of each arriving customer. Regret of our policy scales as O˜(
√
n) with respect to
time horizon n, which is optimal. Further, it scales polynomially in covariate dimension d, as well as
in two smoothness parameters κ1 and κ2 defined as part of our model. In addition, we develop a
scalable implementation of our approach which leverages a semi-parametric regression technique
based on convex optimization. Our simulations show that this scalable policy performs well.
1.1 Related work
Non-contextual dynamic pricing. There is a significant literature on regret analysis of the
dynamic pricing problem without covariates; see [den Boer, 2015] for a detailed survey. For ex-
ample, the works [Le Guen, 2008, Broder and Rusmevichientong, 2012, den Boer and Zwart, 2013,
den Boer, 2014, Keskin and Zeevi, 2014] consider a parametric model whereas [Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003]
consider a non-parametric model for the unknown demand function. Our methodology is most
aligned to that of [Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003], in that we extend their techniques to incorporate
side-information from the covariates.
Contextual dynamic pricing. Recently, the problem of dynamic pricing with high-dimensional
covariates has garnered significant interest among researchers; see, e.g., [Javanmard and Nazerzadeh, 2019,
Ban and Keskin, 2019, Cohen et al., 2016b, Mao et al., 2018, Qiang and Bayati, 2019, Nambiar et al., 2019].
In summary, in contrast to the prior works in dynamic pricing with covariates, ours is the first
work to address a setting where the only feedback from each transaction is binary and the residual
uncertainty given covariates is non-parametric, see Table 1. We believe that these features are
relevant to several online platforms implementing dynamic pricing with high-dimensional covariates,
and thus our work bridges a gap between the state-of-the-art in the academic literature and practical
considerations. Below, we describe some of these prior works below.
1. [Javanmard and Nazerzadeh, 2019] consider a model where the expected valuation given co-
variates is a linear function of the covariates, and where the noise distribution is known. In
other words, their model is fully parametric. Under certain conditions, they show that the
expected regret is logarithmic in time horizon n. They also briefly consider a scenario where
the noise distribution is unknown, but the expected regret they obtain there is linear in n.
2. [Ban and Keskin, 2019] consider a semi-parametric setting where the relationship between the
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expected demand, the covariates, and prices is parametric (in particular, generalized linear),
and the residual noise is non-parametric; however, in their setting the true demand (analogous
to the valuation in our model) is observed by the platform. Their model, as a special case,
allows for binary feedback as well; however, in this special case the model is fully parametric.
Under a sparsity assumption where only s out of d covariates impact the demand, they show
that the optimal regret is O˜(s
√
n log d).
3. [Qiang and Bayati, 2019] considers a model where the expected demand is a linear function
of covariates and prices, and where the true demand is observed by the platform. Under
certain conditions they show that a greedy iterative least squares policy is optimal and achieves
O(log T ) regret.
4. [Nambiar et al., 2019] considers a setup where the model is misspecified; in particular, the
expected demand is assumed to be a linear function of covariates and prices, but in reality the
relationship of demand to covariates is nonlinear. Here again, the true demand at each time
is observed by the platform. Due to misspecification, the noise term in the assumed model
is correlated with the price. They develop an optimal policy where a random perturbation
is added to a greedy choice of price, and use the perturbation as an instrument to obtain
unbiased estimates.
5. [Cohen et al., 2016b] consider a model similar to ours but with known noise distribution, and
with the covariates chosen adversarially. [Cohen et al., 2016b] develop an algorithm based on
an ellipsoid method for solving a system of linear equations which has O(d2 log(n/d)) regret.
[Mao et al., 2018] consider a variant which generalizes linear model to Lipschitz function but
with no noise.
Learning techniques: There is extensive prior work on high-dimensional contextual bandits,
e.g., [Langford and Zhang, 2008, Slivkins, 2011, Perchet and Rigollet, 2013, Greenewald et al., 2017,
Krishnamurthy et al., 2018]; however, their techniques do not directly apply to our setup (in part
due to the censored nature of feedback). Our work is also loosely related to the works on learning
and auctions, e.g. [Amin et al., 2014, Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2016]. We leverage semi-
parametric regression technique with binary feedback from [Plan and Vershynin, 2013] to reduce
computational complexity of our algorithm.
There are some similarities between our work and the literature on bandits with side infor-
mation, e.g., [Mannor and Shamir, 2011, Alon et al., 2013, Caron et al., 2012, Cohen et al., 2016a,
Lykouris et al., 2018]. For example, in their work too there is free exploration where testing for one
arm reveals the reward information for a subset of arms, where the subset may be a function of the
chosen action. However, there are some crucial differences. In particular, these works assume (a)
a discrete set of arms, (b) the existence of a sequence of graphs indexed by time (possibly fixed)
with the arms as its nodes, (c) the action involves pulling an arm, and at each time the reward
at each neighbor of the pulled arm is revealed. However, in our setting, it is important to model
the set of prices, and thus the set of covariate-vector-to-price mappings as described above, as a
continuous set since a constant error in price leads to linear regret. While in our DEEP-C policy we
discretize the set of covariate-vector-to-price mappings into a finite set of arms (which scale with
time horizon), the above assumptions are still not met due to the following. Each arm in our setting
corresponds to a subset of prices/actions. The subset of arms for which the reward is revealed
at time t depends on the covariate xt, and the exact price pt from the above subset. Thus, the
assumption of a pre-defined graph structure is not satisfied.
3
Contextual Non-parametric residuals Binary feedback
[Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003] X X
[Javanmard and Nazerzadeh, 2019] X X
[Qiang and Bayati, 2019] X X
[Cohen et al., 2016b, Mao et al., 2018] X X
[Ban and Keskin, 2019]
X X
X X
[Nambiar et al., 2019] X X
Our work X X X
Table 1: This table compares our results with prior work along three dimensions: (1) incorporating
contextual information; (2) modeling the distribution of residual uncertainty (given the context,
where appropriate) as non-parametric; and (3) receiving only binary success/failure feedback from
each transaction.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we first describe our model and then our objective, which is to minimize regret
relative to a natural oracle policy.
2.1 Model
At each time t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we have a new user arrival with covariate vector Xt taking values
in Rd for d ≥ 1. Throughout the paper all vectors are encoded as column vectors. The platform
observes Xt upon the arrival of the user. The user’s reservation value Vt ∈ R is modeled as
lnVt = θ
ᵀ
0Xt + Z
′
t, (1)
where θ0 ∈ Rd is a fixed unknown parameter vector, and Z ′t for t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} captures the residual
uncertainty in demand given covariates.
Similar to the linear model Vt = θᵀ0Xt + Z
′
t, this model is quite flexible in that linearity is
a restriction only on the parameters while the predictor variables themselves can be arbitrarily
transformed. However, our formulation additionally has the feature that it ensures that Vt > 0
for each t, a key practical consideration. We conjecture that unlike our model, the linear model
Vt = θ
ᵀ
0Xt+Z
′
t does not admit a learning algorithm with O˜(
√
n) regret. This is due to censored nature
of feedback, the structure of revenue as a function of price, and our non-parametric assumption on
the distribution of Z ′t as described below. Also, exponential sensitivity of the valuation with respect
to covariate magnitudes can be avoided by using a logarithmic transformation of the covariates
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themselves. More generally, one may augment our approach with a machine learning algorithm
which learns an appropriate transformation to fit the data well. In this paper, however, we focus on
valuation model as given by (1).
Equivalently to (1), we have
Vt = e
θᵀ0XtZt,
where Zt = eZ
′
t . Thus, Zt > 0 for each t.
The platform sets price pt, upon which the user buys the product if Vt ≥ pt. Without loss of gener-
ality, we will assume the setting where users buy the product; one can equivalently derive exactly the
same results in a setting where users are sellers, and sell the product if Vt ≤ pt. The revenue/reward at
time t is ptYt where Yt = 1Vt≥pt . We assume that pt is σ (X1, . . . , Xt−1, Xt, Y1, . . . , Yt−1, U1, . . . , Ut)
measurable, where Ut for each t ≥ 1 is an auxiliary U [0, 1] random variable independent of the
sources of randomness in the past. In other words, platform does not know the future but it can use
randomized algorithms which may leverage past covariates, current covariate, and binary feedback
from the past.
The goal of the platform is to design a pricing policy {pt}t∈{1,...,n} to maximize the total reward
Γn =
n∑
t=1
Ytpt.
In this paper we are interested in the performance characterization of optimal pricing policies as the
time horizon n grows large.
We make the following assumption on statistics of Xt and Zt.
A1 We assume that {Xt}t and {Zt}t are i.i.d. and mutually independent. Their distributions are
unknown to the platform. Their supports X and Z are compact and known. In particular, we assume
that X ⊂ [− 12 , 12]d and Z is an interval in [0, 1].
A1 can be significantly relaxed, as we discuss in Appendix E (both in terms of the i.i.d. distribution
of random variables, and the compactness of their supports).
A2 The unknown parameter vector θ0 lies within a known, connected, compact set Θ ⊂ Rd. In
particular, Θ ⊂ [0, 1]d.
It follows from A1 and A2 that we can compute reals 0 < α1 < α2 such that for all (z, x, θ) ∈
Z × X ×Θ we have
α1 ≤ zeθᵀx ≤ α2.
Thus, the valuation at each time is known to be in the set [α1, α2], and in turn the platform may
always choose price from this set. Note also that, since Z ⊂ [0, 1], for each (x, θ) ∈ X , we have that
α1 ≤ eθᵀx ≤ α2.
2.2 The oracle and regret
It is common in multiarmed bandit problems to measure the performance of an algorithm against
a benchmark, or Oracle, which may have more information than the platform, and for which the
optimal policy is easier to characterize. Likewise, we measure the performance of our algorithm
against the following Oracle.
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Definition 1 The Oracle knows the true value of θ0 and the distribution of Zt.
Now, let
F (z) = zP(Z1 ≥ z).
The following proposition is easy to show, so the proof is omitted.
Proposition 1 The following pricing policy is optimal for the Oracle: At each time t set price
pt = z
∗eθ
ᵀ
0Xt where z∗ = arg supz F (z).
Clearly, the total reward obtained by the Oracle with this policy, denoted as Γ∗n, satisfies
E[Γ∗n] = nz∗E[eθ
ᵀ
0X1 ].
Our goal: Regret minimization. Given a feasible policy, define the regret against the Oracle
as Rn:
Rn = Γ
∗
n − Γn.
Our goal in this paper is to design a pricing policy which minimizes E[Rn] asymptotically to
leading order in n.
2.3 Smoothness Assumption
In addition to A1 and A2, we make a smoothness assumption described below.
Let
r(z, θ) = zE
[
eθ
ᵀX11
{
Z1e
θᵀ0X1 > zeθ
ᵀX1
}]
,
which can be thought of as the expected revenue of a single transaction when the platform sets price
p = zeθ
ᵀx after observing a covariate X = x. We impose the following assumption on r(z, θ).
A3 Let θ(l) be the lth component of θ, i.e., θ = (θ(l) : 1 ≤ l ≤ d). We assume that there exist
κ1, κ2 > 0 such that for each z ∈ Z and θ ∈ Θ we have
κ1 max
{
(z∗ − z)2, max
1≤l≤d
(θ
(`)
0 − θ(l))2
}
≤ r(z∗, θ0)− r(z, θ) ≤ κ2
d+ 1
‖(z∗ − z, θ0 − θ)‖2
where ‖(z, θ)‖2 =
(
z2 +
∑d
l=1(θ
(l))2
)
.
Recall that F (z) = zP(Z1 ≥ z). It follows from A1 and conditioning on X1 that
r(z, θ) = E
[
eθ
ᵀ
0X1F
(
e−(θ0−θ)
ᵀX1z
)]
.
We will use this representation throughout our development.
Note that A3 subsumes that (z∗, θ0) is the unique optimizer of r(z, θ). This is true if z∗ is the
unique maximizer of F (z) and that θ0 is identifiable in the parameter space Θ.
Below we will also provide sufficient conditions for A3 to hold. In particular, we develop sufficient
conditions which are a natural analog of the assumptions made in [Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003].
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2.4 Connection to assumptions in [Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003]
The ‘stochastic valuations’ model considered in [Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003] is equivalent to our
model with no covariates, i.e., with d = 0. When d = 0 the revenue function r(z, θ) is equal to F (z).
In [Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003] it is assumed that {Zt} are i.i.d., and that F (z) has bounded
support. Clearly A1 and A2 are a natural analog to these assumptions. They also assume that F (z)
has unique optimizer, and is locally concave at the optimal value, i.e., F ′′(z∗) < 0. We show below
that a natural analog of these conditions are sufficient for A3 to hold.
Suppose that (z∗, θ0) is the unique optimizer of r(z, θ). Also suppose that A1 and A2 hold. Then
A3 holds if r(z, θ) is strictly locally concave at (z∗, θ0), i.e., if the Hessian of r(z, θ) at (z∗, θ0) exists
and is negative definite. To see why this is the case, note that strict local concavity at (z∗, θ0) implies
that there exists an  > 0 such that the assumption holds for each (z, θ) ∈ B(z∗, θ0) where B(z∗, θ0)
is the d+ 1 dimensional ball with center (z∗, θ0) and radius . This, together with compactness of
X and Θ, implies A3.
It is somewhat surprising that to incorporate covariates in a setting where F is non-parametric,
only minor modifications are needed relative to the assumptions in [Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003].
For completeness, in the Appendix we provide a class of examples for which it is easy to check that
the Hessian is indeed negative definite and that all our assumptions are satisfied.
3 Pricing policies
Any successful algorithm must set prices to balance price exploration to learn (θ0, z∗) with exploitation
to maximize revenue. Because prices are adaptively controlled, the outputs (Yt : t = 1, 2, . . . , n) will
not be conditionally independent given the covariates (Xt : t = 1, 2, . . . , n), as is typically assumed
in semi-parametric regression with binary outputs (e.g., see [Plan and Vershynin, 2013]). This issue
is referred to as price endogeneity in the pricing literature.
We address this problem by first designing our own bandit-learning policy, Dynamic Experi-
mentation and Elimination of Prices with Covariates (DEEP-C), which uses only a basic statistical
learning technique which dynamically eliminates sub-optimal values of (θ, z) by employing confidence
intervals. At first glance, such a learning approach seems to suffer from the curse of dimensionality,
in terms of both sample complexity and computational complexity. As we will see, our DEEP-C
algorithm yields low sample complexity by cleverly exploiting the structure of our semi-parameteric
model. We then address computational complexity by presenting a variant of our policy which
incorporates sparse semi-parametric regression techniques.
The rest of the section is organized as follows. We first present the DEEP-C policy. We then
discuss three variants: (a) DEEP-C with Rounds, a slight variant of DEEP-C which is a bit more
complex to implement but simpler to analyze theoretically, and thus enables us to obtain O˜(
√
n)
regret bounds; (b) Decoupled DEEP-C, which decouples the estimation of θ0 and z∗ and thus allows
us to leverage low-complexity sparse semi-parametric regression to estimate θ0 but with the cost
of O(n2/3) regret; and (c) Sparse DEEP-C, which combines DEEP-C and sparse semi-parametric
regression to achieve low complexity without decoupling to achieve the best of both worlds. We
provide a theoretical analysis of the first variant, and use simulation to study the others.
While we discuss below the key ideas behind these three variants, their formal definitions are
provided in Appendix B.
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3.1 DEEP-C policy
We now describe DEEP-C. As noted in Proposition 1, the Oracle achieves optimal performance
by choosing at each time a price pt = z∗eθ
ᵀ
0Xt , where z∗ is the maximizer of F (z). We view the
problem as a multi-armed bandit in the space Z ×Θ. Viewed this way, before the context at time
t arrives, the decision maker must choose a value z ∈ Z and a θ ∈ Θ. Once Xt arrives, the price
pt = ze
θᵀXt is set, and revenue is realized. Through this lens, we can see that the Oracle is equivalent
to pulling the arm (z∗, θ0) at every t in the new multi-armed bandit we have defined. DEEP-C is an
arm-elimination algorithm for this multi-armed bandit.
From a learning standpoint, the goal is to learn the optimal (z∗, θ0), which at the first sight
seems to suffer from the curse of dimensionality. However, we observe that in fact, our problem
allows for “free exploration” that lets us to learn efficiently in this setting; in particular, given Xt,
for each choice of price pt we simultaneously obtain information about the expected revenue for
a range of pairs (z, θ). This is specifically because we observe the context Xt, and because of the
particular structure of demand that we consider. However, to ensure that each candidate (z, θ) arm
has sufficiently high probability of being pulled at any time step, DEEP-C selects prices at random
from a set of active prices, and ensures that this set is kept small via arm-elimination. The speedup
in learning thus afforded enables us to obtain low regret.
Formally, our procedure is defined as follows. We partition the support of Z1 into intervals of
length n−1/4. If the boundary sets are smaller, we enlarge the support slightly (by an amount less
than n−1/4) so that each interval is of equal length, and equal to n−1/4. Let the corresponding
intervals be Z1, . . . ,Zk, and their centroids be ζ1, . . . , ζk where k is less than or equal to n1/4.
Similarly, for l = 1, 2, . . . , d, we partition the projection of the support of θ0 into the lth dimension
into kl intervals of equal length n−1/4, with sets Θ
(l)
1 , . . . ,Θ
(l)
kl
and centroids θ(l)1 , . . . , θ
(l)
kl
. Again, if
the boundary sets are smaller, we enlarge the support so that each interval is of equal length n−1/4.
Our algorithm keeps a set of active (z, θ) ⊂ Z × Θ and eliminates those for which we have
sufficient evidence for being far from (z∗, θ0). We let A(t) ⊂ {1, . . . , k}d+1 represent a set of active
cells, where a cell represents a tuple (i, j1, . . . , jd). Then,
⋃
(i,j1,...,jd)∈A(t)Zi ×
∏d
i=1 Θ
(l)
jl
represents
the set of active (z, θ) pairs. Here, A(1) contains all cells.
At each time t we have a set of active prices, which depends on Xt and A(t), i.e.,
P (t) =
p : ∃(z, θ) ∈ ⋃
(i,j1,...,jd)∈A(t)
Zi ×
d∏
l=1
Θ
(l)
jl
s.t. ln p = ln z + θᵀXt
 .
At time t we pick a price pt from P (t) uniformly at random. We say that cell (i, j1, . . . , jd) is
checked if pt ∈ Pi,j1,...,jd(t) where
Pi,j1,...,jd(t) ,
{
p : ∃z ∈ Zi,∃θ ∈
d∏
l=1
Θ
(l)
jl
s.t. ln p = ln z + θᵀXt
}
.
Each price selection checks one or more cells (i, j1, . . . , jd).
Recall that the reward generated at time t is Ytpt. Let Tt(i, j1, . . . , jd) be the number of times
cell (i, j1, . . . , jd) is checked until time t, and let St(i, j1, . . . , jd) be the total reward obtained at
these times. Let
µˆt(i, j1, . . . , jd) =
St(i, j1, . . . , jd)
Tt(i, j1, . . . , jd)
.
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We also compute confidence bounds for µˆt(i, j1, . . . , jd), as follows. Fix γ > 0. For each active
(i, j1, . . . , jd), let
ut(i, j1, . . . , jd) = µˆt(i, j1, . . . , jd) +
√
γ
Tt(i, j1, . . . , jd)
,
and
lt(i, j1, . . . , jd) = µˆt(i, j1, . . . , jd)−
√
γ
Tt(i, j1, . . . , jd)
.
These represent the upper and lower confidence bounds, respectively.
We eliminate (i, j1, . . . , jd) ∈ A(t) from A(t+ 1) if there exists (i′, j′1, . . . , j′d) ∈ A(t) such that
ut(i, j1, . . . , jd) < lt(i
′, j′1, . . . , j
′
d).
3.2 Variants of DEEP-C
DEEP-C with Rounds: Theoretical analysis of regret for arm elimination algorithms typically involves
tracking the number of times each sub-optimal arm is pulled before being eliminated. However, this
is challenging in our setting, since the set of arms which get “pulled” at an offered price depends
on the covariate vector at that time. To resolve this challenge, we consider a variant where the
algorithm operates in rounds, as follows.
Within a round the set of active sells remains unchanged. Further, we ensure that within each
round each arm in the active set is pulled at least once. For our analysis, we keep track of only the
first time an arm is pulled in each round, and ignore the rest. While this may seem wasteful, a
surprising aspect of our analysis is that the regret cost incurred by this form of exploration is only
poly-logarithmic in n. Further, since the number of times each arm is “explored” in each round is
exactly one, theoretical analysis now becomes tractable. For formal definitions of this policy and
also of the policies below, we refer the reader to Appendix B.
Decoupled DEEP-C: We now present a policy which has low computational complexity under
sparsity and which does not suffer from price endogeneity, but may incur higher regret. At
times t = 1, 2, . . . , τ , the price is set independently and uniformly at random from a compact
set. This ensures that outputs (Yt : t = 1, 2, . . . , τ) are conditionally independent given covariates
(Xt : t = 1, 2, . . . , τ), i.e., there is no price endogeneity. We then use a low-complexity semi-
parametric regression technique from [Plan and Vershynin, 2013] to estimate θ0 under a sparsity
assumption. With estimation of θ0 in place, at times t = τ + 1, . . . , n, we use a one-dimensional
version of DEEP-C to simultaneously estimate z∗ and maximize revenue. The best possible regret
achievable with this policy is O˜(n2/3), achieved when τ is O(n2/3) [Plan and Vershynin, 2013].
Sparse DEEP-C: This policy also leverages sparsity, but without decoupling estimation of θ0
from estimation of z∗ and revenue maximization. At each time t, using the data collected in past we
estimate θ0 via semi-perametric regression technique from [Plan and Vershynin, 2013]. Using this
estimate of θ0, the estimate of rewards for different values of z from samples collected in past, and
the corresponding confidence bounds, we obtain a set of active prices at each time, similar to that of
DEEP-C, from which the price is picked at random.
While Sparse DEEP-C suffers from price endogeneity, with an appropriate choice of γ we
conjecture that its cost in terms of expected regret can be made poly-logarithmic in n; proving
this result remains an important open direction. The intuition for this comes from our theoretical
analysis of DEEP-C with Rounds and the following observation: even though the set of active
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prices may be different at different times, we still choose prices at random, and prices are eliminated
only upon reception of sufficient evidence of suboptimality. We conjecture that these features are
sufficient to ensure that the error in the estimate of θ0 is kept small with high probability. Our
simulation results indeed show that this algorithm performs relatively well.
4 Regret analysis
The main theoretical result of this paper is the following. The regret bound below is achieved by
DEEP-C with Rounds (as defined in Section 3.2). For its proof see Appendix C.
Theorem 1 Under A1, A2, and A3, the expected regret under policy DEEP-C with Rounds with
γ = max
(
10α22, 4
κ22
logn ,
κ−21
logn
)
satisfies,
E[Rn] ≤ 16000α−21 α22κ−21 κ3/22 γ3/4d11/4n1/2 log7/4 n+ 5α2.
First, note that the above scaling is optimal w.r.t. n (up to polylogarithmic factors), as even for
the case where Xt = 0 w.p.1. it is known that achieving o(
√
n) expected regret is not possible (see
[Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003]).
Second, we state our results with explicit dependence on various parameters discussed in our
assumptions in order for the reader to track the ultimate dependence on the dimension d. Note that,
as d scales, the supports Θ and X , and the distribution of X may change. In turn, the parameters
α1, α2, κ1 and κ2 which are constants for a given d, may scale as d scales. These scalings need to be
computed case by case as it depends on how one models the changes in Θ and X . Below we discuss
briefly how these may scale in practice.
Recall that α1 and α2 are bounds on zeθ
ᵀx, namely, the user valuations. Thus, it is meaningful
to postulate that α1 and α2 do not scale with covariate dimension, as the role of covariates is to aid
prediction of user valuations and not to change them. For example, one may postulate that θ0 is
“sparse”, i.e., the number of non-zero coordinates of θ0 is bounded from above by a known constant,
in which case α1 and α2 do not scale with d. Dependence of κ1 and κ2 on d is more subtle as they
may depend on the details of the modeling assumptions. For example, their scaling may depend on
scaling of the difference between the largest and second largest values of r(z, θ). One of the virtues
of Theorem 1 is that it succinctly characterizes the scaling of regret via a small set of parameters.
Finally, the above result can be viewed through the lens of sample complexity. The arguments
used in Lemma 1 and in the derivation of equation (4) imply that the sample complexity is “roughly”
O(log(1/δ)/2). More precisely, suppose that at a covariate vector x, we set the price p(x). We say
the mapping p is probably approximately revenue optimal if for any x the difference between the
achieved revenue and the optimal revenue is at most  with probability at least 1− δ. The number of
samples m required to learn such a policy satisfies m polylog(m) ≤ log(1/δ)2 f(d, α1, α2, κ1, κ2) where
f(·) is polynomial function.
5 Simulation Results
Below we summarize our simulation setting and then briefly describe our findings.
Simulation setup: First, we simulate our model with covariate dimension d = 2, where
covariate vectors are i.i.d. d-dimensional standard normal random vectors, the parameter space is
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(a) DEEP-C, d = 2. (b) DEEP-C variants, d = 2
(c) DEEP-C variants, d = 100
Figure 1: Regret comparison of the policies.
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Θ = [0, 1]d, the parameter vector is θ0 = (1/
√
2, 1/
√
2), the noise support is Z = [0, 1], and the
noise distribution is Z ∼ Uniform([0, 1]). Note that even though we assumed that the covariate
distribution has bounded support for ease of analysis, our policies do not assume that. Hence,
we are able to use a covariate distribution with unbounded support in our simulations. In this
setting, we simulate policies DEEP-C, Decoupled DEEP-C, and Sparse DEEP-C for time horizon
n = 10, 000 and for different values of parameter γ. Each policy is simulated 5,000 times for each
set of parameters.
Next, we also simulate our model for d = 100 with s = 4 non-zero entries in θ0, with each
non-zero entry equal to 1/
√
s, each policy is simulated 1,500 times for each set of parameters, with
the rest of the setup being the same as earlier. For this setup, we only simulate Decoupled DEEP-C
and Sparse DEEP-C, as the computational complexity of DEEP-C does not scale well with d.
Main findings: First, we find that the performance of each policy is sensitive to the choice of
γ, and that the range of γ where expected regret is low may be different for different policies. The
expected regret typically increases with increase in γ, however its variability typically reduces with
γ. This is similar to the usual bias-variance tradeoff in learning problems. For our setup with d = 2,
the reward of Oracle concentrates at around 4,150. As Figure 1 shows, each policy performs well in
the plotted range of γ.
We find that the main metric where the performance of the policies is differentiated is in fact
high quantiles of the regret distribution. For example, while the expected regret of DEEP-C at
γ = 2.2 and that of Decoupled DEEP-C and Sparse DEEP-C at γ = 7 each are all roughly the same,
the 98th-percentile of regret distribution under DEEP-C and Sparse DEEP-C is 13% and 24% lower
than that under Decoupled DEEP-C, respectively.
For our setup with d = 100, while both Decoupled DEEP-C and Sparse DEEP-C perform similar
in average regret, we find that Sparse DEEP-C significantly outperforms Decoupled DEEP-C in
standard deviation and in 95th-percentile. In particular, 95th-percentile of Sparse DEEP-C is 33%
lower than that under Decoupled DEEP-C.
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A A class of examples where assumptions A1, A2, and A3
are satisfied
First consider a spherically distributed d dimensional random vector S, i.e., for each d dimensional
orthonormal matrix O the distributions of S and OS are identical. It is known that a d dimensional
random vector S is spherically distributed iff there exists a positive (one dimensional) random
variable R, called generating random variable, such that S =d RU (d) where U (d) is uniformly
distributed on the d dimensional unit hypersphere [Frahm, 2004]. For example, if S is a standard
normal random vector than R2 is a chi-squared distributed random variable. Further, it is also
known that for each spherically distributed S there exists a function φS(.) such that the MGF of S,
namely E[eθᵀS ], is equal to φS(‖θ‖22), where ‖.‖2 represents 2-norm [Frahm, 2004].
Now, suppose that {Xt}t are i.i.d. with a spherical distribution such that the generating random
variable has density with support in [0, 12 ]. Further suppose that {Zt}t are i.i.d. Uniform[0, 1), and
that Θ ⊂ [0, 1]d. Thus A1 and A2 readily hold.
The following facts are easy to show: (i) F (z) = z(1−z) (ii) z∗ = 0.5, (iii) r(z, θ) = zφX1(‖θ‖22)−
z2φX1(‖2θ − θ0‖22), and (iv) (z∗, θ0) is the unique optimizer of r(z, θ). Further, φS(.) is a linear
combination of MGFs [Frahm, 2004] which are convex, and is thus convex itself. Now, let H be the
Hessian of r(z, θ) at (z∗, θ0). With some calculations one can show that for any non-zero y = (z, θ),
we have that
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yᵀHy = −4φ′′X1(‖θ‖22)
(
4z2 + 4z
d∑
l=1
θ(l)θ
(l)
0 + 2
d∑
l=1
d∑
l′=1
θ(l)θ
(l)
0 θ
(l′)θ
(l′)
0 +
d∑
l=1
(
θ(l)(1 + θ
(l)
0 )
)2)
≤ −4φ′′X1(‖θ‖22)
2z2 + 2(θᵀθ0 + z)2 +( d∑
l=1
|θ(l)|(1 + θ(l)0 )
)2
< 0
Thus, the Hessian of r(z, θ) at (z∗, θ0) is negative definite. Thus, as argued in Section 2.3, A3
holds.
B Variants of DEEP-C: Formal Definitions
B.1 DEEP-C with Rounds
We partition the support of Z1 into intervals of length n−1/4. If the boundary sets are smaller, we
enlarge the support slightly (by an amount less than n−1/4) so that each interval is of equal length,
and equal to n−1/4. Let the corresponding intervals be Z1, . . . ,Zk, and their centroids be ζ1, . . . , ζk
where k is less than or equal to n1/4. Similarly, for l = 1, 2, . . . , d, we partition the projection of the
support of the θ0 into the lth dimension into kl intervals of equal length, with sets Θ
(l)
1 , . . . ,Θ
(l)
kl
and
centroids θ(l)1 , . . . , θ
(l)
kl
. Again, if the boundary sets are smaller, we enlarge the support so that each
interval is of equal length, and equal to n−1/4.
Our algorithm keeps a set of active (z, θ) ⊂ Z × Θ and eliminates those for which we have
sufficient evidence for being far from (z∗, θ0).
Our algorithm operates in rounds. We use τ to index the round. Each round lasts for one or
more time steps. Let A(τ) ⊂ {1, . . . , k} where ∪i∈A(τ)Zi represents the set of active z’s. For each
l let Bl(τ) ⊂ {1, . . . , k} where
∏
l ∪j∈Bl(τ)Θ(l)j represents the set of active θ’s in round τ . Then,
(∪i∈A(τ)Zi)×
∏
l ∪j∈Bl(τ)Θ(l)j represents the set of active (z, θ)’s.
During each time t in round τ we have a set of active prices, which depends on Xt and
A(τ)×∏lBl(τ). Let
P (τ, t) =
{
p : ∃z ∈ ∪i∈A(τ)Zi,∃θ ∈
∏
l
∪j∈Bl(τ)Θ(l)j s.t. ln p = ln z + θᵀXt
}
.
During round τ , at each time t we pick a price pt from P (τ, t) uniformly at random. At time t,
we say that cell (i, j1, . . . , jd), i.e. set Zi×Θ(1)j1 ×Θ
(2)
j2
× . . .×Θ(d)jd , is ‘checked’ if pt ∈ Pi,j1,...,jd(τ, t)
where
Pi,j1,...,jd(τ, t) ,
{
p : ∃z ∈ Zi,∃θ ∈
∏
l
Θ
(l)
jl
s.t. ln p = ln z + θᵀXt
}
.
Each price selection checks one or more cells (i, j1, . . . , jd). The round lasts until all active cells
are checked.
Let tτ (i, j1, . . . , jd) be the first time in round τ when the cell (i, j1, . . . , jd) is checked. Recall
that the reward generated ay time t is Ytpt. At the end of each round τ , for each active cell
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(i, j1, . . . , jd) we compute the empirical average of the rewards generated at the times tτ ′(i, j1, . . . , jd)
for τ ′ = 1, . . . , τ , i.e., we compute
µˆτ (i, j1, . . . , jd) =
1
τ
τ∑
τ ′=1
Ytτ′ (i,j1,...,jd)ptτ′ (i,j1,...,jd).
Note that for each cell, in each round we only record reward at the first time the cell is checked
and ignore rewards at the rest of the times in that round. We also compute confidence bounds for
µˆτ (i, j1, . . . , jd), as follows. Let γ = max
(
10α22, 4
κ22
logn ,
κ−21
logn
)
. For each active (i, j1, . . . , jd), let
uτ (i, j1, . . . , jd) = µˆτ (i, j1, . . . , jd) +
√
γd log n
τ
,
and
lτ (i, j1, . . . , jd) = µˆτ (i, j1, . . . , jd)−
√
γd log n
τ
.
These represent the upper and lower confidence bounds, respectively.
We eliminate i ∈ A(τ) from A(τ + 1) if there exists i′ ∈ A(τ) such that
sup
(j1,...,jd)∈
∏
l Bl(τ)
uτ (i, j1, . . . , jd) < inf
(j1,...,jd)∈
∏
l Bl(τ)
lτ (i
′, j1, . . . , jd)
Similarly, we eliminate j ∈ Bl(τ) from Bl(τ + 1) if there exists j′ ∈ Bl(τ) such that
sup
i∈A(τ)
sup
(j1,...,jl−1,jl+1,...,jd)∈
∏
l′ 6=l Bl′ (τ)
uτ (i, j1, . . . , jl−1, j, jl+1, . . . , jd)
< inf
i∈A(τ)
inf
(j1,...,jl−1,jl+1,...,jd)∈
∏
l′ 6=l Bl′ (τ)
lτ (i, j1, . . . , jl−1, j′, jl+1, . . . , jd).
The time-complexity of this policy is driven by the number of cells, which increases as O(nd/4),
and thus scales poorly with d.
B.2 Decoupled DEEP-C
We assume that there exists an s ≤ d such that at most s entries in θ0 are non-zero. The value of s
is known to the platform. Here, s represents sparsity and could be significantly smaller than d. We
also assume that Θ ⊂ {θ : ‖θ‖2 = 1}.
At times t = 1, 2, . . . , dne2/3, select price uniformly at random from [α1, α2]. Then, we estimate
θ0 by solving the following convex-optimization problem:
maximize
θ
dne2/3∑
t=1
(2Yt − 1)(θᵀXt)
subject to ‖θ‖1 ≤ 1√
s
, ‖θ‖2 ≤ 1
(2)
We denote the estimate at θˆ0.
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We partition the support of Z1 into intervals of length n−1/4 as above, and let the corresponding
intervals be Z1, . . . ,Zk with centroids ζ1, . . . , ζk.
Fix γ > 0. For t > dne2/3 we do the following.
We let A(t) ⊂ {1, . . . , k} represent the set of active cells. Then, ∪i∈A(t)Zi represents the set of
active z’s. Here, A(dne2/3 + 1) = {1, . . . , k}.
We let
P (t) =
{
p : ∃z ∈ ∪i∈A(t)Zi s.t. ln p = ln z + θˆᵀ0Xt
}
.
At time time t we pick a price pt from P (t) uniformly at random. We say that cell i, i.e. set Zi,
is ‘checked’ if pt ∈ Pi(t) where
Pi(t) ,
{
p : ∃z ∈ Zi s.t. ln p = ln z + θˆᵀ0Xt
}
.
Each price selection checks one or more cells i. Let Tt(i) be the number of times cell i is checked
till time t and St(i) be the total reward obtained at such times. Let
µˆt(i) =
St(i)
Tt(i)
.
We also compute confidence bounds for µˆt(i), as follows. For each active i, let
ut(i) = µˆt(i) +
√
γ
Tt(i)
,
and
lt(i) = µˆt(i)−
√
γ
Tt(i)
.
These represent the upper and lower confidence bounds, respectively.
We eliminate i ∈ A(t) from A(t+ 1) if there exists i′ ∈ A(t) such that
ut(i) < lt(i
′).
The time-complexity of this policy is driven by that of the convex-optimization problem (2), size
of which scales as O(n2/3d). Note also that the total number of cells in this policy is O(n1/4).
B.3 Sparse DEEP-C
Again, we assume that there exists an s ≤ d such that at most s entries in θ0 are non-zero, and that
the value of s is known to the platform. We also assume that Θ ⊂ {θ : ‖θ‖2 = 1}.
We partition the support of Z1 into intervals of length n−1/4 as above, and let the corresponding
intervals be Z1, . . . ,Zk with centroids ζ1, . . . , ζk. We let A(t) ⊂ {1, . . . , k} represent a set of active
cells at time t. Here, A(1) = {1, . . . , k}. Fix γ > 0.
At each time t, estimate θ0 by solving the following convex-optimization problem:
maximize
θ
t−1∑
t′=1
(2Yt′ − 1)(θᵀXt′)
subject to ‖θ‖1 ≤ 1√
s
, ‖θ‖2 ≤ 1
(3)
17
We denote the estimate as θˆ0(t).
We let
P (t) =
{
p : ∃z ∈ ∪i∈A(t)Zi s.t. ln p = ln z + θˆ0(t)ᵀXt
}
.
At time time t we pick a price pt from P (t) uniformly at random. We say that cell i, i.e. set Zi,
is ‘checked’ if pt ∈ Pi(t) where
Pi(t) ,
{
p : ∃z ∈ Zi s.t. ln p = ln z + θˆ0(t)ᵀXt
}
.
Each price selection checks one or more cells i. Let Tt(i) be the number of times cell i is checked
till time t and St(i) be the total reward obtained at such times. Let
µˆt(i) =
St(i)
Tt(i)
.
We also compute confidence bounds for µˆt(i), as follows. For each active i, let
ut(i) = µˆt(i) +
√
γ
Tt(i)
,
and
lt(i) = µˆt(i)−
√
γ
Tt(i)
.
These represent the upper and lower confidence bounds, respectively.
We eliminate i ∈ A(t) from A(t+ 1) if there exists i′ ∈ A(t) such that
ut(i) < lt(i
′).
The time-complexity of this policy is driven by having to solve the convex-optimization problem
(3) at each time t, size of which scales as O(td). Its implementation at time t can be sped up by
using solution from time t − 1 for initialization. Note also that the total number of cells in this
policy is O(n1/4).
C Proof of Theorem 1
Consider policy DEEP-C with Rounds as defined in Appendix B. The proof follows from a few
technical results that we state now. We provide the statements of these results and delegate their
proofs to Appendix D to not interrupt the logical flow of the proof of the theorem.
First, at the end of round τ , with high probability, the set of active arms corresponds to cells
with guaranteed O
(√
logn
τ
)
expected regret. More precisely, recall the definitions of r(z, θ), ζi,
and θ(l)j . Let
∆(i, j1, . . . , jd) = r(z
∗, θ0)− r
(
ζi, (θ
(l)
jl
: 1 ≤ l ≤ d)
)
.
We have the following result.
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Lemma 1 For each round τ , let E1(τ) be the event that the following holds:
A(τ) ⊂
{
i : sup
(j1,...,jd)
∆(i, j1, . . . , jd) < 16κ2κ
−1
1
√
γd log n
τ
}
,
and for each l
Bl(τ) ⊂
{
j : sup
i
sup
(j1,...,jl−1,jl+1,...,jd)
∆(i, j1, . . . , jl−1, j, jl+1, . . . , jd) < 16κ2κ−11
√
γd log n
τ
}
.
Then,
P(E1(τ)) ≥ 1− 4
n2
.
Second, not only are the corresponding active cells guaranteed to have small expected regret
with high probability, but the size (Lebesgue measure) of the set of active prices is guaranteed to be
small with high probability. The next result provides explicit bound on such size.
Lemma 2 For each τ , the event E1(τ) implies that the following holds for each time t in round τ :
L(P (τ, t)) ≤ 40α
2
2
α1
dκ−11 κ
1/2
2
(
γd log n
τ
)1/4
,
where for each Borel set A, L(A) is its Lebesgue measure.
Third, after verifying that the remaining cells have a suitably controlled expected regret, and
that the size of active arms (prices) is also controlled, we verify that at each time in the current
round any given active cell is checked with substantially high probability.
Lemma 3 Fix round τ . Consider an active cell (i, j1, . . . , jd). Then the probability that the cell
(i, j1, . . . , jd) is checked at time t in round τ is at least α1n
−1/4
L(P (τ,t)) .
Finally, using Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, we are ready to piece together all of the elements (i.e., control
on the performance of active arms, size of the remaining arms, and the speed at which arms are
explored) to obtain the main result, as we do next.
From Lemma 2 we have w.p. 1 that L(P (τ, t)) ≤ δ′ , 40α22α1 dκ
−1
1 κ
1/2
2
(
γd logn
τ
)1/4
for each τ
and t.
Let E2(τ) be the event that the round τ runs for at most 3dδ
′
α1n−1/4
log n times. Since the number
of cells is at most nd/4, by Lemma 3 and union bound we obtain:
P((E2(τ))c) ≤ nd/4
(
1− α1n
−1/4
δ′
)3d δ′
α1n
−1/4 logn
≤ nd/4e−3d logn ≤ nd/4−3d ≤ n−2d
≤ n−2 (4)
Also, recall event E1(τ) from Lemma 1. By the law of total expectation, the expected regret
incurred during round τ , i.e. the difference between expected reward earned by the oracle and the
platform during round τ , denoted as R˜τ , satisfies the following:
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E[R˜τ ] ≤ E[R˜τ |E1(τ), E2(τ)]P (E1(τ) ∩ E2(τ)) + E[R˜τ |E1(τ)c ∪ E2(τ)c]P(E1(τ)c ∪ E2(τ)c).
Here, P (E1(τ) ∩ E2(τ)) ≤ 1, and E[R˜τ |E2(τ)c ∪ E1(τ)c] ≤ α2n since the reward by the Oracle
at any time t is z∗eθ0Xt1 {Vt ≥ pt} ≤ z∗eθ0Xt ≤ z∗α2 ≤ α2, with probability 1. Thus,
E[R˜τ ] ≤ E[R˜τ |E2(τ), E1(τ)] + α2nP((E1(τ)c ∪ E2(τ)c)
≤ E[R˜τ |E2(τ), E1(τ)] + α2n (P((E1(τ)c) + P((E2(τ)c))
Further, from (4) we have that P((E2(τ)c) ≤ n−2, and from Lemma 1 we have that P((E1(τ)c) ≤
4n−2. Also, conditioned on events E1(τ) and E2(τ), we have the following:
(1) each round τ is of length at most 3d log n δ
′
α1n−1/4
(form the definition of E2(τ)), and
(2) the regret incurred is at most 16κ2κ−11
√
γd logn
τ (from the definition of E1(τ)),
(3) δ′ = 40α
2
2
α1
dκ−11 κ
1/2
2
(
γd logn
τ
)1/4
(from definition of δ′).
Thus, we get
E[R˜τ ] ≤
3d log n40α
2
2
α1
dκ−11 κ
1/2
2
(
γd logn
τ
)1/4
α1n−1/4
(16κ2κ−11 √γd log nτ
)
+
5α2
n
.
Upon simplification, we obtain
E[R˜τ ] ≤ 1920α22α−21 κ−21 κ3/22 γ3/4d11/4n1/4 log7/4 nτ−3/4 +
5α2
n
.
Thus, the total expected regret satisfies:
E[Rn] ≤
n∑
τ=1
R˜τ ≤ 2000α22α−21 κ−21 κ3/22 γ3/4d11/4n1/4 log7/4 n
n∑
τ=1
τ−3/4 + 5α2
≤ 16000α−21 α22κ−21 κ3/22 γ3/4d11/4n1/2 log7/4 n+ 5α2.
Hence, the theorem holds. 
D Proof of lemmas used in Theorem 1
We present the proofs of Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 in order.
Proof of Lemma 1: For notational convenience and simplification of regret analysis, we pretend
that the following happens at the end of a round: We simulate ‘virtual times’ during which we
obtain virtual covariates and virtual prices so that we obtain a sample for each inactive set as well
at round τ , and update uτ and lτ accordingly. These times do not count as real times, and since
inactive sets do not take part in any decision making, the above procedure at virtual times incur no
cost and have no bearing to the execution of the actual algorithm in practice.
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Throughout our development, we shall use that, as stated in A3,
κ1(z
∗ − ζi)2 ≤ ∆(i, j1, . . . , jd) ≤ κ2(z∗ − ζi)2.
and for each l,
κ1(θ
(l)
0 − θ(l)jl )2 ≤ ∆(i, j1, . . . , jd) ≤ κ2(θ
(l)
0 − θ(l)jl )2.
Fix a cell (i, j1, . . . , jd) such that ∆(i, j1, . . . , jd) > 16κ2κ−11
√
γd logn
τ . If no such cell exists, then
there is is nothing to prove since in that case P(E1(τ)) = 1. We show that the probability of such a
cell being eliminated is high. Let E′ be the event that cell (i, j1, . . . , jd) has not been eliminated by
the end of round τ . In addition, let E∗m be the event that (i∗, j∗1 , . . . , j∗d) is eliminated at round m,
where (i∗, j∗1 , . . . , j∗d) is the cell that contains (z
∗, θ0). Using union bound, we can write
P(E′) = P (E′ ∩ (∪τm=1E∗m)) + P (E′ ∩ (∩τm=1(E∗m)c))
≤
τ∑
m=1
P(E∗m) + P (E′ ∩ (∩τm=1(E∗m)c)) .
We have two claims,
Claim 1: P(E∗m) ≤ 2 1n4d , and
Claim 2: P (E′ ∩ (∩τm=1(E∗m)c)) ≤ 2n10d .
It follows directly from Claims 1 and 2, since and τ ≤ n, that
P(E′) ≤ τ 2
n4d
+
2
n10d
≤ 1
n3d
+
2
n10d
≤ 4
n3d
.
Since total number of cells is at most nd/4, we have that
P((E1(τ))c) ≤ nd/4 4
n3d
≤ 4
n11d/4
≤ 4
n11/4
,
and hence the lemma would follow. So, we just need to establish Claim 1 and Claim 2.
For Claim 1, note that
P(E∗m) ≤P (∃(i, j1, . . . , jd) s.t. uτ (i∗, j∗1 , . . . , j∗d) < lτ (i, j1, . . . , jd))
≤ nd/4 sup
(i,j1,...,jd)
P (uτ (i∗, j∗1 , . . . , j∗d) < lτ (i, j1, . . . , jd))
≤ nd/4 sup
(i,j1,...,jd)
(
P
(
uτ (i
∗, j∗1 , . . . , j
∗
d) < inf
(z,θ)∈Zi∗×Θj∗1×...×Θj∗d
r(z, θ)
)
+ P
(
lτ (i, j1, . . . , jd) ≥ inf
(z,θ)∈Zi∗×Θj∗1×...×Θj∗d
r(z, θ)
))
,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that l < u implies that for each c we have l < c or
u ≥ c; we are choosing c = inf(z,θ)∈Zi∗×Θj∗1×...×Θj∗d r(z, θ). Further, we have
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P(
uτ (i
∗, j∗1 , . . . , j
∗
d) ≤ inf
(z,θ)∈Zi∗×Θj∗1×...×Θj∗d
r(z, θ)
)
= P
(
µˆτ (i
∗, j∗1 , . . . , j
∗
d) ≤ inf
(z,θ)∈Zi∗×Θj∗1×...×Θj∗d
r(z, θ)−
√
γd log n
τ
)
≤ P
(
µˆτ (i
∗, j∗1 , . . . , j
∗
d) ≤ E[µˆτ (i∗, j∗1 , . . . , j∗d)]−
√
γd log n
τ
)
Note that
0 ≤ µˆτ (i∗, j∗1 , . . . , j∗d) ≤ sup
x∈X ,z∈Z,θ∈Θ
zeθ
ᵀx ≤ α2.
Thus, using Hoeffding’s inequality, we obtain
P
(
uτ (i
∗, j∗1 , . . . , j
∗
d) ≤ inf
(z,θ)∈Zi∗×Θj∗1×...×Θj∗d
r(z, θ)
)
≤ e−
2γd logn
α22
≤ e−20d logn
≤ 1
n20d
.
Fix (i, j1, . . . , jd). From A3 and the fact that each cell is of size n−1/4, we have r(z∗, θ0) −
inf(z,θ)∈Zi∗×Θj∗1×...×Θj∗d
r(z, θ) ≤ κ2(n−1/4)2. Also, from the definition of γ we have that κ2 ≤√
γd logn
4 . Since τ ≤ n we get κ2(n−1/4)2 ≤
√
γd logn
4τ .
Thus, we get that
sup
(z,θ)∈Zi×Θ(1)j1 ×...×Θ
(d)
jd
r(z, θ) ≤ r(z∗, θ0) ≤ inf
(z,θ)∈Zi∗×Θj∗1×...×Θj∗d
r(z, θ) +
√
γd log n
4τ
.
Thus,
P
(
lτ (i, j1, . . . , jd) ≥ inf
(z,θ)∈Zi∗×Θj∗1×...×Θj∗d
r(z, θ)
)
≤ P
lτ (i, j1, . . . , jd) ≥ sup
(z,θ)∈Zi×Θ(1)j1 ×...×Θ
(d)
jd
r(z, θ)−
√
γd log n
4τ

= P
µˆτ (i, j1, . . . , jd) ≥ sup
(z,θ)∈Zi×Θ(1)j1 ×...×Θ
(d)
jd
r(z, θ) +
√
γd log n
4τ

≤ e−
γd logn
2α22
≤ e−5d logn
≤ 1
n5d
22
Thus,
P(E∗m) ≤ 2
1
n5d−d/4
≤ 2 1
n4d
.
Hence, the Claim 1 follows. We now show Claim 2. Note that
P (E′ ∩ (∩τm=1(E∗m)c)) ≤ P (uτ (i, j1, . . . , jd) ≥ lτ (i∗, j∗1 , . . . , j∗d)) .
Let (z′, θ′) ∈ arg sup
(z,θ)∈Zi×Θ(1)j1 ×...×Θ
(d)
jd
r(z, θ). Using the fact that for any u, l, c we have that
u ≥ l implies u ≥ c or c ≥ l, and letting c = (r(z∗, θ0)− r(z′, θ′)) /2 we obtain
P (uτ (i, j1, . . . , jd) ≥ lτ (i∗, j∗1 , . . . , j∗d))
≤ P (uτ (i, j1, . . . , jd) ≥ (r(z∗, θ0)− r(z′, θ′)) /2 + r(z′, θ′))
+ P (lτ (i∗, j∗1 , . . . , j∗d) ≤ r(z∗, θ0)− (r(z∗, θ0)− r(z′, θ′)) /2) . (5)
Now, by A3 and using the fact that γ ≥ κ−21logn , we obtain that
‖(z∗ − ζi, θ0 − (θ(l)jk : 1 ≤ l ≤ k)‖2 ≥ κ−12 (d+ 1)∆(i, j1, . . . , jd) ≥ 16κ−11 (d+ 1)
√
γd log n
τ
≥ 16(d+ 1)
√
d
τ
≥ 16(d+ 1)
√
1
n
.
Further, by construction of the partition, we have |z′ − ζi| ≤ 12n−1/4 and (θ′(l) − θ(l)jl ) ≤ 12n−1/4
for each 1 ≤ l ≤ d. Thus,
∥∥∥(z∗ − ζi, θ0 − (θ(l)jl : 1 ≤ l ≤ d))∥∥∥2 ≤ ‖(z∗ − z′, θ0 − θ′)‖2 + ∥∥∥(z′ − ζi, θ′ − (θ(l)jl : 1 ≤ l ≤ d))∥∥∥2
≤ ‖(z∗ − z′, θ0 − θ′)‖2 + (d+ 1)
(
n−1/4
2
)2
.
In turn, we have
‖(z∗ − z′, θ0 − θ′)‖2 ≥
∥∥∥(z∗ − ζi, θ0 − (θ(l)jl : 1 ≤ l ≤ d))∥∥∥2 − (d+ 1)(n−1/42
)2
.
Thus, by again using A3 we get
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∆(i, j1, . . . , jd)
r(z∗, θ0)− r(z′, θ′) ≤
κ2
∥∥∥(z∗ − ζi, θ0 − (θ(l)jl : 1 ≤ l ≤ d))∥∥∥2
(d+ 1)κ1 max
{
(z∗ − z)2,max1≤l≤d(θ(`)0 − θ(l))2
}
≤
κ2
∥∥∥(z∗ − ζi, θ0 − (θ(l)jl : 1 ≤ l ≤ d))∥∥∥2
κ1 ‖(z∗ − z′, θ0 − θ′)‖2
≤ κ2κ−11
1− (d+ 1)
(
n−1/4
2
)2
∥∥∥(z∗ − ζi, θ0 − (θ(l)jl : 1 ≤ l ≤ d))∥∥∥2

−1
≤ κ2κ−11 (1−
1/4
16
)−1 ≤ 4κ2κ−11 .
Thus, we get
∆(i, j1, . . . , jd) ≤ 4κ2κ−11 (r(z∗, θ0)− r(z′, θ′)). (6)
Consequently,
P (uτ (i, j1, . . . , jd) ≥ (r(z∗, θ0)− r(z′, θ′)) /2 + r(z′, θ′))
≤ P (uτ (i, j1, . . . , jd) ≥ ∆(i, j1, . . . , jd)/(8κ2κ−11 ) + r(z′, θ′))
≤ P
uτ (i, j1, . . . , jd) ≥ 2√γd log n
τ
+ sup
(z,θ)∈Zi×Θ(1)j1 ×...×Θ
(d)
jd
r(z, θ)

≤ P
µˆτ (i, j1, . . . , jd) ≥ 2√γd log n
τ
−
√
γd log n
τ
+ sup
(z,θ)∈Zi×Θ(1)j1 ×...×Θ
(d)
jd
r(z, θ)

= P
µˆτ (i, j1, . . . , jd) ≥√γd log n
τ
+ sup
(z,θ)∈Zi×Θ(1)j1 ×...×Θ
(d)
jd
r(z, θ)

≤ P
(
µˆτ (i, j1, . . . , jd) ≥
√
γd log n
τ
+ E[µˆτ (i, j1, . . . , jd)]
)
Again using Hoeffding’s inequality, we get
P (uτ (i, j1, . . . , jd) ≥ (r(z∗, θ0)− r(z′, θ′)) /2 + r(z′, θ′)) ≤ e
− 2γd logn
α22 ≤ e−20d logn ≤ 1
n20d
. (7)
Now, recall that r(z∗, θ0) − inf(z,θ)∈Zi∗×Θj∗1×...×Θj∗d r(z, θ) ≤ κ2n
−1/2 ≤
√
γd logn
τ . Thus, we
have
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P (lτ (i∗, j∗1 , . . . , j∗d) ≤ r(z∗, θ0)− (r(z∗, θ0)− r((z′, θ′))) /2)
≤ P (lτ (i∗, j∗1 , . . . , j∗d) ≤ r(z∗, θ0)−∆(i, j1, . . . , jd)/(8κ2κ−11 ))
≤ P
(
lτ (i
∗, j∗1 , . . . , j
∗
d) ≤ r(z∗, θ0)− 2
√
γd log n
τ
)
≤ P
(
lτ (i
∗, j∗1 , . . . , j
∗
d) ≤ inf
(z,θ)∈Zi∗×Θj∗1×...×Θj∗d
r(z, θ) +
√
γd log n
τ
− 2
√
γd log n
τ
)
≤ P
(
µˆτ (i
∗, j∗1 , . . . , j
∗
d) ≤ inf
(z,θ)∈Zi∗×Θj∗1×...×Θj∗d
r(z, θ)−
√
γd log n
τ
)
≤ P
(
µˆτ (i
∗, j∗1 , . . . , j
∗
d) ≤ E[µˆτ (i∗, j∗1 , . . . , j∗d)]−
√
γd log n
τ
)
Using Hoeffding’s inequality yet again, we get
P (lτ (i∗, j∗1 , . . . , j∗d) ≤ r(z∗, θ0)− (r(z∗, θ0)− r((z′, θ′))) /2)
≤ e−
2γd logn
α22 ≤ e−20d logn ≤ 1
n20d
. (8)
Claim 2 thus follows from (5), (7) and (8). This completes proof of Lemma 1. We now proceed
with the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Note that, by translation invariance, L(P (τ, t)) = L
(
P (τ, t)− z∗eθᵀ0xt
)
. In addition, for any
measurable set A, we always have the bound L(A) ≤ 2∑a∈A |a|. Therefore, by definition of P (τ, t),
we have
L(P (τ, t)) ≤ 2 sup
z∈ZA,θ∈ΘA
|z∗eθᵀ0xt − zeθᵀxt |,
where ZA and ΘA be the set of active z and θ in round τ . Now, fix (z, θ) ∈ ZA×Θa. Let z∗−z = δz
and θ0 − θ = δθ. Then, at time t in round τ , we have
zeθ
ᵀxt = (z∗ − δz)eθ
ᵀ
0xte−δ
ᵀ
θ xt
= eθ
ᵀ
0xt(z∗ − δz)
(
1− (1− e−δᵀθ xt)
)
= eθ
ᵀ
0xt
(
z∗
(
1− (1− e−δᵀθ xt)
)
− δz
(
1− (1− e−δᵀθ xt)
))
= eθ
ᵀ
0xt
(
z∗ − z∗(1− e−δᵀθ xt)− δz + δz(1− e−δ
ᵀ
θ xt)
)
= eθ
ᵀ
0xtz∗ + eθ
ᵀ
0xt
(
−z∗(1− e−δᵀθ xt)− δze−δ
ᵀ
θ xt
)
= eθ
ᵀ
0xtz∗ − eθᵀ0xt
(
z∗(1− e−δᵀθ xt) + δze−δ
ᵀ
θ xt
)
.
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Recall that α1 ≤ eθᵀx ≤ α2 for each x ∈ X and θ ∈ Θ. Thus,
e−δ
ᵀ
θ xt =
eθ
ᵀxt
eθ
ᵀ
0xt
≤ α2
α1
.
Thus, by triangle inequality, and noting that z∗ ≤ 1 as Z is a subset of the unit interval, we have
L(P (τ, t)) ≤ 2 sup
z∈ZA,θ∈ΘA
∣∣∣eθᵀ0xt (z∗(1− e−δᵀθ xt) + δze−δᵀθ xt)∣∣∣
≤ 2α2
(
sup
θ∈ΘA
∣∣∣z∗(1− e−δᵀθ xt)∣∣∣+ sup
z∈ZA,θ∈ΘA
∣∣∣δze−δᵀθ xt∣∣∣)
≤ 2α2 sup
θ∈ΘA
∣∣∣z∗(1− e−δᵀθ xt)∣∣∣+ 2α2 sup
z∈ZA,θ∈ΘA
∣∣∣δze−δᵀθ xt∣∣∣
≤ 2α2 sup
θ∈ΘA
∣∣∣(1− e−δᵀθ xt)∣∣∣+ 2α22
α1
sup
z∈ZA
|δz| .
From Lemma 1, for each τ and each time t in round τ , with probability at least 1− 4/n2 the only
active cells (i, j1, . . . , jd) are the ones such that ∆(i, j1, . . . , jd) ≤ 16κ2κ−11
√
γd logn
τ . Thus, under
E1(τ), we have
sup
z∈ZA
κ1 |δz|2 ≤ 16κ2κ−11
√
γd log n
τ
.
Also, for each θ, ∣∣∣(1− e−δᵀθ xt)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣δᵀθxt − e−δ2 (δᵀθxt)2
∣∣∣∣ ,
for some 0 < |δ| < |δᵀθxt|. Since 0 < |δ| < |δᵀθxt|, we have e−δ ≤ sup(1, e−δ
ᵀ
θ xt) ≤ α2/α1. Thus, by
triangle inequality and noting that X and Θ are a subset of unit hypercube, we get
sup
θ∈ΘA
∣∣∣(1− e−δᵀθ xt)∣∣∣ ≤ sup
θ∈ΘA
|δᵀθxt|+
α2
α1
sup
θ∈ΘA
|δᵀθxt|2
≤ sup
θ∈ΘA
‖δθ‖1 ‖xt‖∞ +
α2
α1
sup
θ∈ΘA
‖δθ‖21 ‖xt‖2∞
≤ sup
θ∈ΘA
‖δθ‖1 +
α2
α1
sup
θ∈ΘA
‖δθ‖21
≤ 4α2
α1
sup
θ∈ΘA
‖δθ‖1
≤ 4α2
α1
dκ−11
√
16κ2
√
γd log n
τ
.
Thus, we get
26
12
|P (τ, t)| ≤ α
2
2
α1
κ−11
√
16κ2κ
−1
1
√
γd log n
τ
+ 4
α22
α1
dκ−11
√
16κ2
√
γd log n
τ
,
≤ 5α
2
2
α1
dκ−11
√
16κ2
√
γd log n
τ
.
This completes the proof of Lemma 2. We now proceed to the proof of Lemma 3.
Proof of Lemma 3: Since the price at time t is picked uniformly at random from P (τ, t), and
since Pi,j1,...,jd(τ, t) ⊂ P (τ, t), we have that the probability that the cell (i, j1, . . . , jd) is checked
at time t in round τ is equal to L(Pi,j1,...,jd (τ,t))L(P (τ,t)) . Thus, the result would follow if we show that
L(Pi,j1,...,jd(τ, t)) ≥ n−1/4α1 w.p. 1. We show that below.
Fix θ from
∏
l Θ
(l)
jl
. For each x ∈ X let
P (x) ,
{
p : ∃z ∈ Zi s.t. p = zeθᵀx
}
.
Since L(Zi) = n−1/4, for each x ∈ X we have
L(P (x)) = n−1/4eθ
ᵀx ≥ n−1/4α1.
Thus, L(P (Xt)) ≥ n−1/4α1 w.p. 1. But, by definition we have P (Xt) ⊂ Pi,j1,...,jd(τ, t). Thus,
L(Pi,j1,...,jd(τ, t)) ≥ n−1/4α1 w.p. 1. This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
E Extensions
E.1 Incorporating adversarial covariates
We believe that the i.i.d. assumption on covariates can be significantly relaxed. As a prelude,
consider the following modification to A1.
A4 We assume that {Zt}t are i.i.d. with compact support Z. We assume that the support of Xt for
each t is compact, namely X . Given the past, Xt can be chosen adversarially from its support. More
formally, we assume that X is σ(X1, . . . , Xt−1, Z1, . . . , Zt−1, p1, . . . , pt−1)-measurable.
Given Assumption A4, consider the following strengthening of Assumption A3. Recall that
F (z) = zP(Z1 > z). Let
r(z, θ, x) = eθ
ᵀ
0xF
(
e−(θ0−θ)
ᵀxz
)
.
Given covariate x, r(z, θ, x) can be viewed as the expected revenue at (z, θ).
A5 We assume that there exist κ1, κ2 > 0 such that for each z ∈ Z, θ ∈ Θ, and x ∈ X we have
κ1 max
{
(z∗ − z)2, max
1≤l≤d
(θ
(`)
0 − θ(l))2
}
≤ r(z∗, x, θ0)− r(z, x, θ) ≤ κ2
d+ 1
‖(z∗ − z, θ0 − θ)‖2
where ‖(z, θ)‖2 =
(
z2 +
∑d
l=1(θ
(l))2
)
.
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We conjecture that under assumptions A4, A2, and A5, a suitable modification to policy DEEP-C
with Rounds would achieve a regret scaling similar to (if not the same as) that in Theorem 1. This
conjecture rests on the following two key observations: (1) The optimal policy for the Oracle with
adversarial covariates is the same as that under the i.i.d. covariates setting; and (2) policy DEEP-C
with Rounds for i.i.d. covariates does not learn or use the distribution of Xt (except via the knowledge
of the constants α2, κ1 and κ2).
E.2 Relaxing compactness of support of covariates
We believe that the compactness assumption of X in A1 can also be significantly relaxed. For example,
consider the following simple relaxation. (We say that a random variable W is σ-subgaussian if
P(X > t) ≤ e−σ2t2 .)
A6 {Xt}t and {Zt}t are i.i.d. and mutually independent. Their distributions are unknown to the
platform. The support of Z1, namely Z, is compact and known. Let
W = sup
z∈Z,θ∈Θ
zeθ
ᵀX1 .
W is σ-subgaussian for a known σ > 0.
Under A2, and A3, and A6 we can obtain a result analogous to Theorem 1 as follows.
Recall that the policy DEEP-C with Rounds requires knowledge of α2, which in this case may
be infinity. However, the platform can compute α′2 such that P (W > α′2) ≤ 1/n2, and execute
policy DEEP-C with α′2 instead of α2. Thus, the probability of event {∃t ∈ {1, . . . , n}Vt > α′2} is
at most 1/n, and the overall impact of such an event on expected regret is O(1). Using the fact
that, since Z and Θ are compact, there exists α′1 > 0 (possibly unknown to the platform) such that
P (W < α′2) ≤ 1/n2, we can obtain a regret bound similar to Theorem 1.
28
